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September 24, 2019 
 
Vanessa Countryman, Secretary 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
100 F Street, NE 
Washington, DC 20549-0609 
 
Re:  Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions; 
File Number S7-08-19 
  
Dear Ms. Countryman: 
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Concept Release on Harmonization of 
Securities Offering Exemptions (the “Release”).  Robert Anderson is a Professor of Law at 
Pepperdine whose research and teaching focuses on Mergers & Acquisitions, Securities 
Regulation, and Corporate Law.  Samantha Prince is an Associate Professor at Dickinson Law 
whose teaching focuses on Business Associations and Entrepreneurship Law.  John Neil Conkle 
and Sarah Zomaya, from Pepperdine and Dickinson, respectively, who are both interested in 
corporate and securities law, assisted the Professors.  We write in our personal capacities and our 
institutional affiliation is for identification purposes only.  All will be collectively referred to as 
the “Commenters.”   
We applaud the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “Commission”) initiative to 
simplify, harmonize, and improve the exempt offering framework.  We also support reviewing 
whether certain aspects of the exempt offering framework unduly burden capital formation or 
investor access to investment opportunities.  In particular, we would like to offer a proposal to 
correct what we perceive as a weakness of Rule 506(b), the most heavily utilized safe harbor of 
the Securities Act of 1933’s registration requirement.   
 
Specifically, our proposal will address “whether it would be consistent with capital formation 
and investor protection for [the Commission] to consider steps to make a broader range of 
investment opportunities available to those investors currently considered non-accredited,” as 
queried on page 23 of the Release.  We believe the answer—from both perspectives—is yes.   
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Additionally, regarding the Commission’s enumerated requests for comment, this comment is 
intended to be responsive to the following queries: 
  
●   2. “Are there burdens imposed by the rules that can be lifted while still providing 
adequate investor protection?”  (We believe there are.)  
●   10. “Which conditions are most or least effective at protecting investors in exempt 
offerings.”  (We believe the information requirements under Rule 502(b) fall in this 
category.) 
●   11. “Should we amend the existing exemptions . . . to accommodate some form of non-
accredited investor participation such that these exemptions may be more attractive to, or 
more widely used by, issuers?”  (We believe so.) 
 
We address these points herein. 
 
Rule 506(b)’s Overly Burdensome Information Disclosure Requirements 
 
As mentioned above, our proposal focuses on Regulation D’s information disclosure 
requirements under the Rule 506(b) exemption from registration.  Currently, 506(b) permits a 
maximum of 35 non-accredited investors to participate in an offering under that exemption.  But 
because issuers must provide non-accredited investors with information disclosures pursuant to 
Rule 502(b), very few non-accredited investors have to the opportunity to participate in Rule 
506(b) offerings.  This is one reason non-accredited investors lack access to the private markets, 
even when they are intimately familiar with the issuer offering securities.   
 
We believe issuers exclude non-accredited investors from 506(b) offerings for many reasons, but 
among the most important are: (1) the issuers’ justifiable fear of exposing themselves to the risk 
of liability if required to provide specific information to purchasers, and (2) the substantial 
professional service fees related to providing information disclosures.1  More concerningly, the 
accredited investors upon whom issuers rely for capital may be inclined to point to these facially 
legitimate reasons as a pretext to exclude employees and other individual investors who may not 
be able to provide substantial sums of capital in Rule 506 offerings.  The Commenters 
encountered this dynamic in early-stage venture capital financings, which, perversely, is a 
context where knowledge of the mechanics and risks of equity investing is widespread even 
among non-accredited investors.  It is also a context where non-accredited investors are most 
                                                                                                 
1 As an illustration, in an offering that exceeds $7.5 million, Rule 502(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B) requires companies to provide 
non-accredited investors the same financial and non-financial information that would be contained in a registration 
statement.  17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i).  Gathering the information contained in a registration statement is one 
reason going public is so costly for companies.  One technology startup counsel the Commenters spoke to estimates 
these disclosures cost a minimum of $15,000-$20,000 in fees, generally borne by the issuer.    
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likely to be familiar with the issuer’s business, often as employees in a startup.  As a result, even 
investors who have financial expertise, an ability to understand the risks, and who perhaps work 
for the issuer are effectively barred by Rule 502(b) from investment opportunities that accredited 
investors are able to take advantage of.     
 
Thus, a fresh look at the rules applicable to 506(b) offerings could meaningfully increase non-
accredited investors’ access to private company investment and promote capital formation.  And 
importantly—as will be further discussed—we believe our proposal to supplement Rule 506(b) is 
entirely compatible with investor protection.   
Our Proposal Will Increase Investor Access While Ensuring Investor Protection 
Modest changes to Rule 506(b) would provide a pathway to including non-accredited investors 
without triggering the disclosure requirements.  In particular, we propose that Rule 506(b) permit 
issuers to offer and sell to non-accredited investors the same class of securities pursuant to the 
same terms in an aggregate amount that is less than or equal to the amount sold to accredited 
investors in the offering, subject to limitations on the amount any individual non-accredited 
investor puts at risk.  Crucially, our proposal would ensure investor protection by limiting the 
amount non-accredited investors may purchase.    
In this section we detail our Covered Investor concept.  Below, we first provide suggestions for 
specific rule changes that could implement the proposal.  Implementing the proposal would 
require a new definition of Covered Investor plus two additional alterations to the existing 
Regulation D text.  Our purpose of providing specific language is to make the proposal precise 
and to illustrate the regulatory feasibility of our proposal.  Then, we discuss the reasoning 
underlying each aspect of our proposal, the intended effects, and make further recommendations.  
The Covered Investor Concept, Generally 
The Covered Investor concept would consist of a new defined term containing three operative 
provisions that might apply to Rule 506(b) offerings.  A general summary of the three operative 
provisions follows: 
•   Covered Investor, a new definition under Rule 501, would identify certain non-accredited 
investors who could purchase securities under Rule 506(b) without triggering the 
information disclosure requirements.     
•   The Aggregate Offering Limitation would ensure the offering continues to constitute a 
substantial offering to accredited investors and that the Covered Investor concept does 
not permit issuers to conduct Rule 506 offerings aimed primarily at non-accredited 
investors.  Specifically, the limitation would allow Covered Investors to purchase in Rule 
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506(b) offerings only up to the amount purchased by accredited investors, reduced by the 
amount of payments to executive officers, directors, and promoters. 
•   The Individual Investment Limitation would ensure that Covered Investors are able to 
bear the risk of loss of any investment.  We propose adopting investment limits for 
Covered Investors that are identical to those that apply to non-accredited investors under 
Tier 2 of Regulation A.  So under our proposal, Covered Investors could only pay up to 
10% of the greater of their annual income or net worth for securities in the offering.2  
This would have the added benefit of harmonizing the two frameworks’ investor 
protections for non-accredited investors.  
Covered Investor Definition  
We propose implementing the Covered Investor concept by adding a new definition to Rule 501 
that reads as follows: 
Covered investor.  Covered investor shall mean any person, other than an accredited 
investor, who purchases securities in a transaction under § 230.506(b) and who satisfies 
all of the following conditions or the issuer reasonably believes satisfies all of the 
following conditions:  
(1)  The person has waived, in a signed writing, such person’s right to be 
furnished information pursuant to § 230.502(b)(1) in connection with the 
sale of securities to that person; 
(2)  The aggregate price of the securities purchased by the person plus those 
securities purchased by other covered investors in the transaction is less 
than or equal to the price of securities of the same class purchased by 
accredited investors in the transaction less any payments to executive 
officers, directors or promoters required to be disclosed in Item 16 of the 
notice of sales on Form D; and 
(3)  The aggregate purchase price paid for the securities by the person is no 
more than ten percent (10%) of the greater of the person’s: 
(i)   Annual income or net worth if a natural person (with annual 
income and net worth for such natural person purchasers 
determined as provided in Rule 501 (§ 230.501)); or 
(ii)  Revenue or net assets for such purchaser’s most recently 
completed fiscal year if a non-natural person.  
  
 
                                                                                                 
2 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(i). 
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Easing The Disclosure Requirement and “Sophistication” Inquiry for Covered Investors 
With the definition of Covered Investor in place, we propose two changes.  First, we propose the 
operative change to Rule 506(b)’s information disclosure requirement by amending Rule 
502(b)(1) to read as follows:  
If the issuer sells securities under § 230.506 to any purchaser who is neither an accredited 
investor nor a covered investor, the issuer shall furnish the information specified in 
paragraph (b)(2) of this section to such purchaser at a reasonable time prior to sale. 
[emphasis added]. 
Second, in order to be attractive to issuers as potential investors, Covered Investors would need 
to be exempt from the “sophistication” requirements of Rule 506(b)(2)(ii).   Covered Investors 
(who are, by definition, non-accredited) in the offering would otherwise trigger a fact-intensive 
inquiry into their knowledge and experience, which would likely deter issuers from permitting 
them to participate.  Accordingly, we propose amending Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) to read as follows: 
Nature of Purchasers.  Each purchaser who is not (i) an accredited investor either alone or 
with his purchaser representative(s) or (ii) a covered investor has such knowledge and 
experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits 
and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably believes immediately 
prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description.  [emphasis 
added]. 
Aggregate Investment Limitation 
Our proposed Covered Investor definition, detailed above, imposes an Aggregate Investment 
Limitation.  This limitation requires that the total purchase price paid by Covered Investors not 
exceed the aggregate price paid by accredited investors, net of any payments to executive 
officers, directors, or promoters required to be disclosed in Item 16 of Form D.  The purpose of 
this limitation is three-fold.  First, the limitation ensures a small investment by an accredited 
investor not be used as a basis for soliciting or accepting large amounts from non-accredited 
investors.  Second, it provides some measure of validation of the offering that accredited 
investors’ monetary participation in the offering equals or exceeds the Covered Investors’.  
Third, it prevents executive officers, directors, and promoters from artificially inflating the 
aggregate investment amount and then distributing the funds to themselves after the offering 
If the Commission believes the Aggregate Investment Limitation does not sufficiently protect 
Covered Investors, the Aggregate Investment Limitation could be limited further to the amounts 
invested by accredited investors with indicia of accredited investor sophistication, such as only 
counting the aggregate investment of accredited investors such as those in §230.501(a)(4) (“any 
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director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities being offered or sold, 
or any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer”). 
Individual Investment Limitation 
The proposed Individual Investment Limitation is designed to ensure that any Covered Investor 
participating in the offering without the benefit of the specified information disclosure has the 
financial resources to bear the risk of any loss. This same limitation currently applies to non-
accredited investors participating in Tier 2 Regulation A offerings.  The Commenters believe the 
proposed Individual Investment Limitation would ensure that Covered Investors would not 
sustain losses that severely strain their financial resources.  
Elimination of the “Sophistication” Requirement for Covered Investors 
The elimination of the “sophistication” requirement in Rule 506(b)(ii)(2) for Covered Investors 
is likely necessary to induce issuers to use this new pathway.  The fact-intensive nature of any 
sophistication inquiry would expose issuers to risk and provide a pretext to exclude non-
accredited investors.  We believe the Aggregate Offering Limitation and the Individual Offering 
Limitation, working in tandem, adequately protects Covered Investors without the need for a 
sophistication inquiry.  
 Subsequent Benefits for Business Combinations and Recapitalizations  
We believe our proposal would ameliorate problems that arise in business combinations or 
recapitalizations when non-accredited investors are already present as stockholders (for example, 
as a result of employee stock grants or options).  When such transactions take place and 
constitute sales of securities under Rule 145, issuers often need to deal with non-accredited 
investors separately, such as through reverse stock splits or having accredited investors buy the 
shares.  Our proposal will allow all investors to be treated equally in these transactions. 
Increase Form D Filing Incentives 
There is widespread anecdotal evidence that the apparent absence of consequences for failing to 
file Form D has led to noncompliance in some cases.  In order to better track Regulation D 
offerings and ensure the valuable data arising from Form D is more representative, we propose 
the Commission consider some consequence for willful failure to file Form D as required.  This 
would permit the Commission to monitor the operation of these rule changes and to particularly 
gather more reliable evidence on the effect of these changes on non-accredited investors.  
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Conclusion:  Our Proposal Ensures Investors Access to Rule 506(b) Offerings via Choice of 
Information Disclosure  
Increasing investors’ choice and access to investment opportunities is an important priority.  
Rule 506(b) is not formally limited to accredited investors.  But the information disclosure 
requirements under Rule 502 too-often prevent “Main Street” investors from participating in 
Rule 506 offerings, even when they are intimately familiar with the business of the issuer.  We 
hope our proposal would, if implemented, contribute to the overall mission of increasing investor 
access to private markets by permitting them to exercise choice as to which disclosures they 
receive.  And, as previously discussed, we believe the confluence of investors’ business 
expertise, particularly in the venture capital context, with the proposal’s imposition of Aggregate 
and Individual Investment Limitations on Covered Investors, would ensure adequate investor 
protection to those who exercise their choice.   
Our proposal also protects against the risk of widespread recruitment of non-accredited investors 
in exempt offerings.  Because our proposal would only apply to Rule 506(b) offerings, it would 
be inapplicable to offerings using general solicitation and advertising.  As a result, the non-
accredited investors participating in the offering would be those closely associated with the 
company, such as consultants, advisors, contractors, or employees.3 
For all these reasons, we hope the Commission will consider allowing non-accredited investors 
access to Rule 506(b) offerings via regulatory changes resembling our proposal.    
We thank the Commission, again, for the opportunity to comment.  The Commenters stand ready 
to provide additional information and assistance to the Commission or any interested parties as 
needed.  
Sincerely,  
Robert Anderson     Samantha Prince 
Professor of Law     Associate Professor  
Pepperdine School of Law    Penn State Dickinson Law 
 
John Neil Conkle     Sarah Zomaya 
Pepperdine School of Law, Class of 2019  Penn State Dickinson Law, Class of 2020  
                                                                                                 
3 Although Rule 701 provides employees with the opportunity to invest, the exemption is not available in capital-
raising transactions.  17 C.F.R. § 230.701(c)(iii).   
  
